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Abstract
The current development policy focus on poverty reduction is erroneous. Historically, successful 
development policy—from the late ﬁ  fteenth century until the beginning of the twenty-ﬁ  rst—has 
achieved structural change away from dependence on raw materials and agriculture, adding 
specialized manufacturing and services subject to increasing returns with a complex division of 
labour. In contrast, the Millennium Development Goals are heavily biased in favour of palliative 
economics: alleviating the symptoms of poverty, rather than attacking its real causes. This creates 
a system of ‘welfare colonialism’ increasing the dependence of poor countries, thereby hindering, 
rather than promoting, long-term structural change.
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and Development to Prevent ‘Welfare Colonialism’
Erik S. Reinert
“…just as we may avoid widespread physical desolation by rightly 
turning a stream near its source, so a timely dialectic in the 
fundamental ideas of social philosophy may spare us untold social 
wreckage and suffering.”
Herbert S. Foxwell, Cambridge economist, 1899
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are noble goals for a world sorely in need of urgent action 
to solve pressing social problems. They rest, however, upon completely new principles whose long-term 
effects are neither well thought through nor well understood. In this paper, I shall attempt to explain why 
the MDGs do not represent good social policy in the long run. 
One novelty of the MDG approach lies in the emphasis on foreign ﬁ  nancing of domestic social 
and redistribution policies rather than on domestic ﬁ  nancing by the developing countries themselves. 
Disaster relief, which used to be of a temporary nature, now ﬁ  nds a more permanent form in the MDGs. 
In countries where more than 50 per cent of the government budget is ﬁ  nanced by foreign aid, huge ad-
ditional resource transfers are being planned. This raises the question of the extent to which this approach 
will put a large number of nations permanently ‘on the dole’, a system similar to ‘welfare colonialism’, 
which will be discussed at the end of the paper. 
The pursuit of the MDGs may appear as if the United Nations institutions have abandoned the 
effort to treat the causes of poverty and have instead concentrated on attacking its symptoms. In this 
paper, I shall argue that palliative economics has, to a considerable extent, taken the place of development 
economics. Indeed, the balance between development economics (radically changing the productive struc-
tures of poor countries) and palliative economics (easing the pains of economic misery) is key to avoiding 
long-term negative effects. 
How we used to deal with problems of development
In less than one generation, a stark contrast has emerged between the type of economic understanding 
underlying the Marshall Plan, on the one hand, and the type of economic theory behind today’s multilat-
eral development discourse and the Washington institutions, on the other. The Marshall Plan grew out of 
recognition of the ﬂ  aws of its precursor, the Morgenthau Plan. While the goal of the Morgenthau Plan was 
to deindustrialize Germany, the goal of the Marshall Plan was not only to reindustrialize Germany but also 
to establish a cordon sanitaire of wealthy nations along the borders of the communist bloc in Europe and 
Asia, from Norway to Japan. The self-enforcing mechanisms that maintain the vicious circles of a Mor-
genthau Plan are outlined in ﬁ  gure 1 while the virtuous circles of a Marshall Plan are outlined in ﬁ  gure 2. Figure 1. The mechanisms of a Morgenthau Plan: the
                     ‘vicious circle’ of economic underdevelopment
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Source:  Reinert (1980:.41). 
Note: It is futile to attack the system at any one point, e.g., by increasing investment when wages are 
still low and demand is absent.  An instance of this is poor capital utilization and excess capacity in 
Latin American least developed countries. 
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Judging from the number of nations lifted out of poverty, this reindustrialization plan was probably 
the most successful development project in human history. The fundamental insight behind the Marshall 
Plan was that the economic activities in the countryside were qualitatively different from those in the cities. 
In his famous June 1947 speech at Harvard, United States Secretary of State George Marshall (later award-
ed the Nobel Peace Prize) stressed that “the farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the 
city dweller for the other necessities of life”. This division of labour, i.e., between activities with increasing 
returns in the cities and activities with diminishing returns in the countryside, “is the basis of our modern 
civilization” said Marshall, adding that at the present time it was threatened with breakdown. In this way, he 
recognized the relevance of the cameralist and mercantilist economic policies of previous centuries.
Figure 2. The systemic effects of a Marshall Plan: the
              ‘virtuous circle’ of economic development
Note:  In a closed system, with a constant employment rate, the only way that GNP per 
capita can grow is through the "virtuous circle".  However, the system can be cut off at 
any one point, e.g., if higher demand goes to foreign goods alone, the circle will break. 
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Economists and statesmen from Antonio Serra and Alexander Hamilton to Abraham Lincoln 
and Friedrich List would certainly have agreed that civilization requires activities generating increasing 
returns. The principles behind the ‘toolbox’ used by nations going from poverty to wealth, through the 
creation of ‘city activities’ (appendix 1), have been surprisingly consistent. Yet, many of today’s problems 
are due to the conditionalities imposed by the Washington institutions that outlaw the use of the policy 
measures contained in this toolbox. 
After World War II, these general principles did not produce the same success in every country. 
Some of the most successful countries (e.g., the Republic of Korea (South Korea)) temporarily protected 
new technologies for the world market, while some of the least successful ones permanently protected 
mature technologies, often for small home markets, by limiting competition (e.g., the small countries of 
Latin America). Appendix 2 classiﬁ  es ‘good’ and ‘bad’ protectionist practices. In many countries, how-
ever, real wages were considerably higher when this inefﬁ  cient industrial sector was in place than they are 
today with a much weakened industrial sector (see, for example, ﬁ  gure 3). For centuries it was understood 
that having an ‘inefﬁ  cient’ industrial sector produced higher real wages than having no industrial sector at 
all, and that this ‘inefﬁ  cient’ sector ought to be made more efﬁ  cient rather than be closed down. Figure 3 
suggests that we may have established a world economic order that maximizes international trade rather 
than international welfare. 
In its simplest form, this argument is born out of the role of increasing and diminishing returns in 
trade theory as the starting points for virtuous and vicious circles of growth or poverty. A praxis ignoring 
these mechanisms may cause factor price polarization rather than factor price equalization. Serra (1613) 
ﬁ  rst established increasing returns, virtuous circles and large economic diversity as necessary elements 
for wealth creation. This principle was used almost continuously—with brief interruptions—until it was 
abandoned with the emergence of the ‘Washington Consensus’. Since the 1980s, ‘structural adjustment’ 
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has deindustrialized many poor peripheral countries and produced falling real wages.1 Mainstream theory 
has long claimed that deindustrialization does not matter. On the contrary, according to the ﬁ  rst World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Director-General, Renato Ruggiero, free trade would unleash “the borderless 
economy’s potential to equalize relations between countries and regions”. 
In the 1930s, maintaining the gold standard and balancing the budget were viewed as economic 
fundamentals which locked the world into a sub-optimal equilibrium and prevented Keynes’ policies from 
being carried out. Similarly, having free trade as the ideological centrepiece of development policies since 
the debt crises of the 1980s has locked the less industrialized countries into a suboptimal equilibrium. 
Rather than continuing policies based on the most simplistic version of mainstream trade theory, 
the conﬂ  ict between free trade and real wages in non-industrialized countries must be considered seri-
ously. Specialization in activities with diminishing returns in the face of increasing population pressures 
also has serious environmental consequences (Reinert, 1996). 
Poverty in many Third World and former Second World countries is not caused by transitory 
problems but rather by the permanent features of nations that have different economic structures. His-
torically, few nations had the ambition to compete with the world industrial leaders of the day. But they 
understood that compared to being a supplier of raw materials, the nation could massively improve its 
welfare by industrializing, even if the industrial structure created would end up being less efﬁ  cient than 
that of the world leader. The logic is like that of an individual who, instead of being London’s most ef-
ﬁ  cient shoeshine boy, raises his income by choosing to become a mediocre lawyer.2 Thus, when United 
States started industrializing, its leaders merely wanted to create a (less efﬁ  cient) version of the produc-
tion structure in England, a process which required tariffs. Successful industrialization under protection, 
however, carries the seeds of its own destruction. By the 1880s, United States economists—invoking the 
same arguments based on scale and technology that were used to protect industries in the United States 
in the 1820s—argued for free trade. The same tariff that created a manufacturing industry for a period 
of time was now hurting the same industry (Schoenhof, 1883). This is why Friedrich List, a prominent 
protectionist, was in favour of global free trade only after all countries had achieved their comparative 
advantage outside the diminishing returns sector (Reinert, 1998). In other words, he disagreed not over the 
principle of free trade as such, but rather over its timing.
If one reads Adam Smith, an icon of free trade and laissez-faire, on economic development at an 
early stage, one ﬁ  nds his views are very much in line with those of classical development economists who 
advocate industrialization. In his earlier work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1759/1812), Smith 
argued for ‘the great system of government’, which is helped by adding new manufactures. Interestingly, 
he argued that new manufactures are not to be promoted to help suppliers or consumers but in order to 
improve the ‘great system of government’.
1  This analysis is complicated by the fact that the incomes of employees and the self-employed as a share of GDP 
has been falling in most countries, while proﬁ  ts and earnings—particularly of the FIRE sector (ﬁ  nance, insurance, 
real estate)—have been growing. This wage/self-employed share of GDP has been close to 70 per cent in Norway 
and around 23 per cent in Peru. 
2  The idea that a nation upgrading its skills in the same way a person could do, was part of the US industrialization 
strategy from the 1820s (Raymond 1820). 6  DESA Working Paper No. 14
It is also possible to argue that Adam Smith was a misunderstood mercantilist, who strongly sup-
ported the mercantilist policies of the past, but argued that they were no longer necessary for England. 
He praised the Navigation Acts protecting English manufacturing and shipping against Holland, arguing 
“they are as wise…as if they had all been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom” and holding them to 
be “perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England” (Smith, 1776/1976: I, 486-487). All 
in all, Smith described a development that had become self-sustaining—a kind of snowball effect—origi-
nating in the protectionist measures of the past. Only once did Smith use the term ‘invisible hand’ in The 
Wealth of Nations—when it sustained the key import substitution goal of mercantilist policies, and the 
consumer preferred domestic to foreign industry (Smith, 1776/1976: 477). This was only possible when 
‘the market’ took over the role previously played by protective measures, and national manufacturing no 
longer needed such protection. 
 The praxis of economic development has been to assimilate and produce less efﬁ  cient ‘cop-
ies’ of the economic structure of wealthy nations. The key features of the economic structure of wealthy 
nations—a large division of labour (with a large number of different industries and professions) and a 
sector with increasing returns (industry and knowledge-intensive services)—were codiﬁ  ed by econo-
mists such as Antonio Serra (1613), James Steuart (1767), Alexander Hamilton (1791) and Friedrich List 
(1841/1909). These principles are, at times, unlearned—as in France in the 1760s, Europe in the 1840s 
and the world in the 1990s. 
These periods ultimately came to an end because of their great social costs, however. Physiocracy 
in France created shortages and scarcity of bread, contributing to the onset of the French revolution (see, 
for example, Kaplan, 1976). The free trade euphoria of the 1840s met its backlash in 1848, with revolu-
tions in all large European countries except England and Russia. David Ricardo’s trade theory has been 
proven wrong every time it is applied asymmetrically to increasing and diminishing return industries.3 He 
is right, however, in saying that the ‘natural’ wage level is subsistence. The trade liberalization euphoria 
of the 1990s has increased poverty in several peripheral countries, but our response to this has also been 
wrong. We have been focusing too much on the symptoms—rather than the causes—of the problem. 
The present situation 
Standard economics tends to see development as a process largely driven by accumulation of investments 
in physical and human capital. (Nelson 2006). Standard economic theory underlying today’s development 
policies is generally unable to recognize qualitative differences between economic activities. Almost none 
of today’s failed or failing states could pass George Marshall’s test for what brings about modern civili-
zation, as they have very weak manufacturing sectors and are unable to generate the virtuous exchange 
between city and rural activities. They also have very little diversity in their economic base, a limited divi-
sion of labour and specialize in activities subject to diminishing returns. 
Historically, modern democracy began in nations where this civilizing trade between urban and 
rural areas had already been established, e.g., in the Italian city states. In the most successful city states—
including states with a scarcity of arable land, such as Venice and the Dutch Republic—power did not lie 
with the landowning class. In Florence, 40 or so landowning families were banned from political life in 
3  This asymmetry is the core of the argument in Frank Graham’s 1923 article, a basis for Krugman’s New Trade 
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the thirteenth century, thus enabling Schumpeterian ‘cronyism’ where political and economic interests 
‘colluded’ in ways that created widespread wealth. Dependency on raw materials encouraged feudalism 
and colonialism, neither of which leads to political freedom. Similarly, the United States Civil War was 
essentially between the South, where landowners had vested interests in agriculture and cheap labour, and 
the North, which had vested interests in industrialization. The history of Latin America has been, in many 
ways, similar to the history of the United States, except that the outcome was analogous to the South’s 
winning the Civil War. 
 In the alternative economic paradigm—which could broadly be called evolutionary and histori-
cal—the process of development is driven by assimilation: learning from more advanced countries by 
‘copying’ both their economic structure and their institutions.4 Key elements in this assimilation strategy 
are institutions such as patent protection, scientiﬁ  c academies and universities. In this model, economic 
growth tends to be activity-speciﬁ  c, tied to ‘clusters’ of economic activities characterized by increasing 
returns, dynamic imperfect competition and rapid technological progress. In addition to capital, the pro-
cess requires transferring and mastering skills and, above all, creating a viable market for activities with 
increasing returns where the absence of purchasing power and massive unemployment tend to go hand 
in hand. By generally using models assuming full employment, the Washington institutions avoid a key 
issue that locks nations in poverty—the lack of formal employment. Since sixteenth-century Holland and 
Venice, only nations with healthy manufacturing sectors have achieved anything close to full employment 
without massive rural underemployment. 
The dominant economic theory today represents what Schumpeter called “the pedestrian view 
that it is capital per se that propels the capitalist engine”: development is seen as largely driven by the 
accumulation of capital, physical or human. According to Richard Nelson, “The premise of neoclassical 
theory is that, if the investments are made, the acquisition and mastery of new ways of doing things are 
relatively easy, even automatic” (Nelson 2006). More importantly, a core assumption of standard eco-
nomics that is seldom acknowledged is that economic structure is irrelevant, as capital per se will lead to 
economic development, regardless of the economic structure within which investment is made. The alter-
native theory suggests that economic activities have very different windows of opportunity as carriers of 
economic growth. In other words, we have to rid ourselves of what James Buchanan calls ‘the equality as-
sumption’ in economic theory, which is probably its most important, but least discussed assumption.5 The 
ability, at any time, to absorb innovation and knowledge—and consequently to attract investments—varies 
enormously from one economic activity to another.
The Problem 
Viewing capital per se as the key to growth, loans are given to poor nations with productive/industrial 
structures that are unable to absorb such capital proﬁ  tably. Interest payments often exceed the rate of 
return on investments made. ‘Financing for development’ may therefore take on the characteristics of a 
pyramid scheme, the only ones to gain being those who started the scheme and who are close to the door 
(see Kregel, 2004). Similarly, investments in human capital, made without corresponding changes in the 
productive structure to create demand for the skills acquired, will tend to promote emigration. In both 
4  Historical evidence of this practice in Europe can be found in Reinert (2004a). 
5  At core, the Enlightenment project was one of ordering the world by creating taxonomies or classiﬁ  cation systems, 
of which Linnaeus’s is the best known. Neoclassical economics achieves analytical precision precisely by lacking 
any taxonomy: everything is qualitatively alike. Therefore its conclusions, like factor price equalization, are es-
sentially already built into its assumptions. 8  DESA Working Paper No. 14
cases, Gunnar Myrdal’s ‘perverse backwashes’ of economic development will be the result: more capi-
tal—both monetary and human—will ﬂ  ow from the poor to the rich countries. One explanation for this 
lies in the type of economic structure—locked into a vicious circle with a lack of supply and demand and 
an absence of increasing returns—that characterizes poor nations. United States industrial policy from 
1820 to 1900 is probably the best example for Third World countries to follow today until these nations 
are ready to beneﬁ  t from international trade. 
Recommendation 
As with the Marshall Plan, funds must be matched by the establishment of industrial and service sectors 
that can absorb the physical and human investments. Diversiﬁ  cation from raw material production is nec-
essary to create a basis for democratic stability and increased welfare, even if the new sectors are initially 
unable to survive world market competition. This incipient industrialization will need special treatment of 
the kind afforded by the Marshall Plan and will require interpreting the Bretton Woods agreement in the 
same manner as in the immediate post-World War II era. 
The neoclassical economists’ poor understanding of how businesses operate also contributes to 
the problem. At the core of their economic theory of capitalism is perfect competition and equilibrium, a 
state which produces very little proﬁ  t. Any successful and proﬁ  table business enterprise rests, almost by 
deﬁ  nition, on some kind of rent-seeking. The poverty-stricken Third World probably most closely cor-
responds to conditions of diminishing returns and perfect competition, while the rich countries, whose 
exports are produced under conditions of Schumpeterian-dynamic imperfect competition, are ‘rent seek-
ers’, whose rents lead to higher wages and a higher tax base. This failure to understand development as 
Schumpeterian imperfect competition is at the heart of the arguments against industrial policy. Anything 
that causes imperfect competition tends to be seen as contributing to corruption and ‘cronyism’. 
Keynes saw investments as resulting from what he called ‘animal spirits’. Without ‘animal spir-
its’—the will to invest in uncertain conditions—capital is sterile, in the worlds of both Joseph Schumpeter 
and Karl Marx. The motivating force behind ‘animal spirits’ is the desire to maximize proﬁ  ts, thus upset-
ting the equilibrium of perfect competition. From a businessman’s point of view, poor countries often 
suffer from low investments because of a lack of proﬁ  table investment opportunities, largely due to low 
purchasing power and high unemployment. Subsistence farmers are not proﬁ  table customers for most 
producers of goods and services. Tariffs can create incentives to move production to the labour markets 
of the poor. Historically, this has been seen as a conscious trade-off between the interests of ‘man-as-a-
wage-earner’ and ‘man-as-a-producer’. The idea that industrialization would rapidly increase employment 
and wages—which would more than offset the temporarily higher cost of manufactured goods—was at 
the core of Prebisch’s import-substitution industrialization, as well as of United States economic theory 
around 1820 (see, for example, Raymond, 1820). 
The idea that greater ‘openness’ would improve the lot of the poor countries is both counter-intui-
tive and contrary to historical experience. In many cases, the sudden ‘opening’ of a backward economy 
killed off the little manufacturing activity that existed, thus exacerbating the situation (see Reinert, 2004b; 
2003). From the uniﬁ  cation of Italy in the nineteenth century to the integration of Mongolia and Peru 
(see Roca and Simabuco 2004) in the 1990s, historical experience shows that free trade between nations 
of very different levels of development tends to destroy the most efﬁ  cient industries in the least efﬁ  cient 
countries (the Vanek-Reinert effect). Figure 3 shows how the export increases that followed the opening Development and Social Goals: Balancing Aid and Development ...  9
up of the Peruvian economy were accompanied by falling real wages. In Peru, as in many other Latin 
American countries, real wages peaked during the period of ‘inefﬁ  cient’ import substitution. The ports, 
airports, roads, power stations, schools, hospitals and service industries created by this inefﬁ  cient indus-
trial sector led by rent-seekers were real and could not have been created without the demand for labour 
and infrastructure that this sector generated.6 
The timing of opening an economy is also crucial. Opening up an economy too late can seriously 
hamper growth, while opening up an economy too early will result in deindustrialization, falling wages7 
and increasing social problems. An anonymous traveller, who observed the effects of economic policy in 
different European countries in 1786, reached this conclusion: “Tariffs are as harmful to a country after 
the arts [manufacturing industry] have been established there, as they are useful to it in order to introduce 
them” (Anonymous, 1786: 31).
Southern Mexico experienced this destructive sequence of deindustrialization, de-agriculturaliza-
tion8 and depopulation. That large numbers of subsistence farmers should be made ‘uncompetitive’ by 
subsidized First World agriculture is a relatively new, but alarming, trend that may persist even after the 
subsidies are removed. In India, there are around 650 million farmers, a large proportion of whom will 
be as ‘uncompetitive’ as their Mexican colleagues if and when free trade opens up. In the poorest coun-
tries today, a trade-off exists between maximizing international trade—which is what present policies 
achieve—and maximizing human welfare (see ﬁ  gure 3). This trade-off needs to be addressed in a manner 
different than that of merely compensating the losses of the poor countries through increased aid. 
History has shown that the vicious circles of poverty and underdevelopment can be effectively at-
tacked by changing the productive structure of poor and failing states. This entails increasing diversiﬁ  ca-
tion away from sectors with diminishing returns (traditional raw materials and agriculture) to sectors with 
increasing returns (technology intensive manufacturing and services), in the process creating a complex 
division of labour and new social structures. In addition to breaking away from subsistence agriculture, 
this will create an urban market for goods, which will induce specialization and innovation, bring in new 
technologies and create alternative employment as well as the economic synergies that unite a nation-
state. The key to coherent development is an interplay between sectors with increasing and diminishing 
returns in the same labour market. 
Arguments against industrial policy 
Malthusian vs. Schumpeterian cronyism 
2005: A Filipino sugar producer uses his political inﬂ  uence to get import protection for his 
products. 
2000: Mayor Daley of Chicago (ignoring the advice of University of Chicago economists) pro-
vides subsidies to already wealthy high-tech investors through an incubator programme. 
6  I am grateful to Carlota Perez for having formulated this insight.
7  Though not necessarily falling GDP per capita (see footnote 1). 
8  As imported and subsidized United States food takes over from local maize and wheat production.10  DESA Working Paper No. 14
1950s and 1960s: 
  Swedish industrialist Marcus Wallenberg uses his close contacts with Labour Party Minis-
ter of Finance, Gunnar Sträng, to win political support to carry out his plans for the Swed-
ish companies Volvo and Electrolux. 
1877: Steel producers in the United States use their political clout to impose 100 per cent duty on 
steel rails (Taussig, 1897: 222).
1485: Woolworkers use their connections to King Henry VII to inﬂ  uence the state to give them 
subsidies and to impose an export duty on raw wool so as to increase raw material prices 
for their competitors on the Continent, thus slowly killing the wool industry elsewhere, 
e.g., in Florence. 
The above examples all involve crony capitalism and rent-seeking behaviour that mainstream economic 
theory tends to abhor. A crucial difference separates the ﬁ  rst example from the rest, however. The Filipino 
crony differs from the other cronies in that he gets subsidies for a raw material with diminishing returns 
that competes in a world market facing perfect competition. In other words, he is a Malthusian crony, 
leading his country down the path of diminishing returns (in spite of technological change which coun-
teracts this). The others are Schumpeterian cronies, producing under what Schumpeter called historical 
increasing returns (a combination of both increasing returns and fast technological change). If we couple 
this with trade theory, we see that the tilted playing ﬁ  elds of Schumpeterian cronyism produce vastly dif-
ferent results than those of the Malthusian crony. 
Keynes once said, “the worse the situation, the less laissez-faire works”. If we insist on abandon-
ing industrial policy because moving away from perfect competition will cause some cronies to get rich, 
we have totally misunderstood the nature of capitalism. After all, capitalism is about getting away from 
perfect competition. 
Economic development is caused by structural changes which break the equilibrium, creating 
rents. Insisting on the absence of rents is insisting on a steady and stationary state. There is still a need 
to choose which activities to protect, however, which in turn creates cronies. Abraham Lincoln protected 
the steel cronies—by paying a little more for steel,9 the United States created a huge steel industry with 
many high-paying jobs that also provided a base for government taxation. Economic development is about 
aligning the public interests of the nation with the private vested interests of the capitalists. The failure of 
standard economics to understand the dynamics of the business world will lead to a failure to understand 
the economic essence of colonialism. By preventing colonies from having their own manufacturing indus-
tries, economic activities with high growth potential and mechanization remained in the mother country, 
whereas activities with diminishing returns went to the colonies. 
The immense transfers that accompany the MDG process will necessarily also lead to cronyism. 
Through this initiative, some will get wealthy, since crony-free economics only exists in neoclassical 
models. By opting for Schumpeterian cronyism, instead of aid-based cronyism, it will be possible for poor 
countries to extricate themselves from economic dependency. 
We seem to have unlearned the logic behind policy tools for economic development. Patents 
and modern tariffs were created at about the same time, in the late 1400s. These rent-seeking institutions 
9  That the steel tariff later got as high as 100 per cent was a result of technological change and rapidly falling prices 
in a situation where the tariff was not based on value, but weight (dollars per ton). Development and Social Goals: Balancing Aid and Development ...  11
were created using the very same understanding of the process of economic development in order to 
protect knowledge (in the case of patents) and to produce in new geographic areas (in the case of tariffs). 
Both patents and tariffs represent legalized rent-seeking to promote goals not achievable under perfect 
competition. 
Why are the rent-seeking and cronyism arguments not applied to patents, but only used against 
tariffs and other policy instruments used in poor countries? With some justiﬁ  cation, it can be said that the 
wealthy countries are establishing rules that legalize constructive rent-seeking in their own countries but 
prohibit similar ones in the poor countries. 
The Washington Consensus and sequential single-issue management
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, variations of neoclassical economics became the only game in town. 
Neoclassical economics was, however, in Nicholas Kaldor’s term, an untested theory. Although neoclassi-
cal theory had provided an effective ideological shield during the Cold War, no nation had ever been built 
on this theoretical framework. In its most extreme form, as practiced around 1990, if nations ‘got their 
prices right’, economic growth would follow automatically, regardless of economic structures. By 1990, 
policy recommendations were formulated around Samuelson’s ‘law’ of factor price equalization and ne-
glected other important theoretical contributions, including key insights by the founding father of neoclas-
sical economics, Alfred Marshall. Marshall had not only described taxes on activities with diminishing 
returns in order to subsidize activities with increasing returns as being good development policy, but he 
had also emphasized the importance of a nation’s producing in sectors where most technical progress was 
to be found, as well as the role of synergies (industrial districts). 
In the 1990s, as the world economy failed to deliver results following trade liberalization, the 
search began for other explanations based on the premises of neoclassical economics. The search for a 
factor which would ensure factor price equalization with free trade resulted in various policy fads: 
‘getting prices right’; 
‘getting property rights right’; 
‘getting institutions right’; 
‘getting governance right’; 
‘getting competitiveness right’;
‘getting national innovation systems right’;
‘getting entrepreneurship right’. 
This vision of ‘the borderless economy’s potential to equalize relations between countries and regions’ 
was based on erroneous theory, and instead became a nightmare in many poor countries. As economic 
growth is an uneven process by nature, only wise political intervention can even out factor price polariza-
tions. Attributing poverty to a lack of entrepreneurship comes across as being particularly uninformed. In 
contrast to most people in wealthy countries who can make a living on their largely routine jobs, the poor 
of the world have to use their entrepreneurial talents every day in order to secure sustenance. 
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a)   Its inability to register qualitative differences, including the different potentials of econom-
ic activities as contributors to economic growth; 
b)   Its inability to acknowledge synergies and linkages;10 and 
c)   Its inability to cope with innovations and novelties, and how these are differently distrib-
uted among economic activities. 
Together, these blind spots of contemporary mainstream economics prevent many poor countries from 
developing. China and India—probably today’s most successful developing countries—have, for decades, 
followed the recommendations of the Marshall Plan, rather than the Washington Consensus. 
While learning is a key element in development, it may also be passed on in the economy sim-
ply as falling prices to foreign consumers. The key insight by Schumpeter’s student Hans Singer was 
that learning and technological change in the production of raw materials, particularly in the absence of 
a manufacturing sector, tend to lower export prices, rather than increase the standard of living in the raw 
material producing nation (Singer, 1950). Learning tends to create wealth for producers only when they 
are part of a close network, once called ‘industrialism’—a dynamic system of economic activities subject 
to increasing productivity through technical change and a complex division of labour. The absence of 
increasing returns, dynamic imperfect competition and synergies in raw material-producing countries are 
all part of the mechanisms that perpetuate poverty. 
Since the 1990s, huge resources have been increasingly employed by well-intentioned govern-
ments along the largely sterile ‘mainstream’ path of inquiry, without exploring alternative theoretical ap-
proaches. The best social policy, however, is to create development, but not by the rich creating subsidized 
reservations where the poor are kept, largely underemployed and ‘underproductive’. The Indian reserva-
tions in North America are a sad example of policies that subsidize without changing productive struc-
tures. Similarly, the MDGs are far too biased towards palliative economics rather than structural change, 
i.e., towards treating the symptoms of poverty rather than its causes. While such policies may be needed 
under current critical conditions, they will remain poor social policies in the longer term unless the deeper 
roots of the problem are confronted. 
Although malaria was endemic to Europe for centuries, present not only in the South but also 
in the Alpine valleys all the way to the Kola peninsula in north-western Russia, Europe rid itself of the 
disease through industrialization and development. Advanced and intensive agriculture, irrigation systems, 
huge public health efforts and eradication plans enabled Europe to eradicate malaria. Europe’s develop-
ment over time also enabled European states to honour their debts. 
Instead of embarking on a similar economic development model, Africa continues to preserve 
colonial economic structures, exporting raw materials and maintaining underdeveloped industrial sectors. 
Debt cancellation and free mosquito nets merely address the symptoms of these problems. 
10  The slogan ‘get national innovation systems right’ proved to be an exception as it refers to a synergistic phe-
nomenon. However, this does not lead very far because of the theory’s inability to distinguish between different 
windows of opportunity, e.g., for innovation in Microsoft, under hugely increasing returns, and in a goat herding 
ﬁ  rm in Mongolia, under critically diminishing returns. In standard analysis, Schumpeterian economics tends to be 
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Creating ‘welfare colonialism’
Current policies risk inadvertently undermining the development potential of aid with its palliative effects. 
What we may be creating is a system that could be described as ‘welfare colonialism’, a term coined to 
describe the economic integration of the native population in Northern Canada (Paine, 1977). The essen-
tial features of welfare colonialism are: 
1)   A reversal of the colonial drain of the old days, the net ﬂ  ow of funds going to the colony 
rather than to the mother country; 
2)   Integration of the native population in ways that radically undermine their previous liveli-
hoods; and 
3)   The placing of the native population on unemployment beneﬁ  ts. 
In Paine’s view, welfare colonialism identiﬁ  es welfare as the vehicle for stable ‘governing at a distance’ 
through exercise of a particularly subtle, ‘non-demonstrative’ and dependency-generating form of neoco-
lonial social control that pre-empts local autonomy through ‘well-intentioned’ and ‘generous’, but ulti-
mately ‘morally wrong’, policies. Welfare colonialism creates paralyzing dependencies on the ‘centre’ in a 
peripheral population, a centre exerting control through incentives that create total economic dependency, 
thereby preventing political mobilization and autonomy. The social conditions in which the native inhabit-
ants of North American reservations ﬁ  nd themselves today show us that, in their case, the ﬁ  nal effect of 
massive transfer payments has been to create a dystopia, rather than a utopia. 
The recent discussion on whether or not aid to Ethiopia should be cut as a sanction against the 
Ethiopian government illustrates the kind of dilemmas which will necessarily accompany “welfare colo-
nialism”. The rich countries will always be in the position to cut off aid, food and livelihood sources of 
poor countries if they disapprove of their national policies. As long as ‘development aid’ remains pallia-
tive, rather than developmental, seemingly generous and well-intentioned development aid will inevita-
bly become extremely powerful mechanisms by which rich countries end up controlling poor countries. 
Rather than promoting global democracy, such policies will lead towards global plutocracy.
We already see aid and other transfers creating passivity and disincentives to work in poor na-
tions. Haitian observers point to family transfer payments from the United States, which create disincen-
tives to work for a going rate of US$0.30 an hour in Haiti. A Brazilian research project on the highly laud-
able Zero Hunger Project, carried out at different government levels (national, state and local) for various 
programmes targeted to ﬁ  ght hunger, concludes that these projects are, to a large extent, ineffective since 
they treat the symptoms of poverty by distributing food or subsidizing food prices rather than by creating 
situations where the poor can become breadwinners (Lavinas and Garcia, 2004). These are welfare colo-
nialism effects that result from treating the symptoms, rather than addressing the causes of poverty. 
The idea of nations producing under increasing returns (industrialized nations) paying annual 
compensation to nations producing under constant or diminishing returns (raw material producers) is not 
a new one. It is a logical conclusion of standard trade theory and has been present in United States college 
textbooks from the 1970s.11 Until recently, the favoured option was to industrialize the poor countries, 
11  ‘Thus the country which eventually specializes completely in the production of X (that is, the commodity whose 
production function is characterized by increasing returns to scale) might agree to make an income transfer (an-
nually) to the other country, which agrees to specialize completely in Y (that is, the commodity whose production 
function is characterized by constant returns to scale)’ (Chacholiades, 1978: 199). See also Reinert (1980).14  DESA Working Paper No. 14
even if it meant that their industries would not be competitive in the world market for a considerable 
period of time. Making free trade the linchpin of the world economic system—one to which all other con-
siderations must yield—has made welfare colonialism appear as the only option. The alternative option 
of developing the poor world is presently absent because many do not wish to abolish free trade as the 
core of the world economic order. The long-term and cumulative effects of having this group of nations 
specialize in pre-industrial economic structures will be staggering, however. 
In 1947, political pressure due to the spectre of communism resulted in successful development 
practices. The free traders in Washington had to yield to the political need for protectionist development 
policies encircling the communist bloc, which led to the astonishing success of the Marshall Plan in Eu-
rope and the East Asian miracle. It is perhaps a faint hope that today’s terrorist threat will yield a similar 
situation where free trade is temporarily abandoned in order to promote development as a political, rather 
than a social, goal. 
During the Enlightenment, civilization and democracy were understood to be products of a 
speciﬁ  c type of economic structure. The origins of this understanding can be found more than 100 years 
earlier; according to Francis Bacon (1620), “There is a startling difference between the life of men in the 
most civilized province of Europe, and in the wildest and most barbarous districts of New India. This dif-
ference comes not from the soil, not from climate, not from race, but from the arts”. When German econo-
mist Johan Jacob Meyen stated in 1770, “It is known that a primitive people does not improve their 
customs and institutions, later to ﬁ  nd useful industries, but the other way around”, he expressed 
something which was considered common sense at the time. Nineteenth-century thinkers, from 
Abraham Lincoln to Karl Marx, shared the idea that civilization is created by industrialization. 
As Marx put it, “Industrialization “draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization”. 
We ought to use our understanding of policies that have been successful in the past to solve 
today’s challenges, while remaining ﬁ  rmly grounded in an understanding of the present technological 
and historical context. The connection between production and civilization must be understood, and the 
theoretical focus should shift from trade to production. Different technological developments affect differ-
ent economic activities, creating huge variations in the windows of opportunity to innovate. Hence, core 
issues—like economies of scale, specialization, lock-in effects, the effects of diminishing returns, the as-
similation of knowledge, and the economic structures of poor countries—should not be ignored. We should 
read not only Schumpeter on technical change and ‘creative destruction’, but also open our eyes and minds 
to the type of ‘destructive destruction’ that can be observed in the peripheral countries of the world. 
Europe’s present problems reﬂ  ect the problems of globalization
As mentioned earlier, our present failure to understand why so many countries stay poor is intimately tied 
to a number of blind spots that make it extremely difﬁ  cult, if not impossible, to create a theory of uneven 
economic development. As Lionel Robbins warned us more than 50 years ago, the basic features of the 
neoclassical paradigm produces a Harmonielehre, where economic harmony is already built into the as-
sumptions on which the theory rests. Today, this paradigm hinders, rather than helps, our understanding 
of the reasons behind poverty. As Thomas Kuhn (1962: 37) said, “A paradigm can, for that matter, even 
insulate the community from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, 
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Any long-term solution for Africa and other poor regions will have to rest on a theory of uneven 
development. This theory, which allowed for successful economic policy for 500 years—from Henry 
VII’s England in 1485 to the integration of Spain and Portugal into the European Union (EU) in 1986—is 
now virtually extinct. Although a complete outline of this theory and its accompanying policy measures 
lies beyond the scope of this paper, some core elements can be mentioned here. 
The present approach towards the poor is very much tilted in favour of palliative economics to 
ease the pains of poverty rather than to permanently eradicate it through economic development. In addi-
tion, the current approach makes it possible to continue and even extend (as in the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) negotiations) present practices without investigating the problems with globalization in the 
periphery. The same myths—based on ideology rather than experience—and the same policies are still in 
place. Keeping in power the same people who introduced the neoclassical shock therapy measures respon-
sible for much of the problem has been a mistake. It virtually guarantees that we do not engage in a funda-
mental discussion of what went wrong. Instead, what is needed is a theory that explains why economic 
development, by its very nature, is such an uneven process. Only then can the appropriate policy measures 
be put in place. 
The problems created by the currently dominant economic theory are not limited to the Third 
World countries. In the case of the EU, most developed nations have experienced increasing economic 
inequalities internally. The same problems are thus experienced on three levels—globally, within the EU 
and within most developed nations. The cause behind these developments is essentially the same: theo-
ries that worked for centuries have been abandoned. Tensions within the European Community are the 
result of the same economic forces that create poverty around the world. Those in the old member states 
of the EU feel betrayed because their welfare is being eroded, while those in the new member states feel 
betrayed because their welfare is not improving as fast as expected. Not surprisingly, this unexpected situ-
ation has caused many to ask what went wrong.
Although German economist Friedrich List (1789-1846) is hardly mentioned in today’s economic 
textbooks, his economic principles not only industrialized Continental Europe in the nineteenth century, 
but also facilitated European integration from the early 1950s up to and including the successful inte-
gration of Spain and Portugal into the EU in 1986. It was not until the introduction of the Stability and 
Growth Pact that List’s principles were abandoned in favour of the kind of economics that dominates the 
Washington Consensus. The result has been increasing unemployment and poverty in the old core coun-
tries, inﬂ  aming the debate that resulted in the rejection of the proposed new European constitution (see 
Reinert and Kattel, 2004). 
Below are three of List’s key principles, which contrasted with standard textbook economics. In 
order to develop Africa and other poor countries, the present neoclassical economic principles must be 
abandoned in favour of the old Listian principles. 
Listian principle: A nation ﬁ  rst industrializes and is then gradually integrated economically 
into nations at the same level of development.
Neoclassical principle: Free trade is the goal per se, even before the required stage of in-
dustrialization is achieved. The 2004 EU enlargement was directly at variance with Listian 
principles. First, the former communist countries in Eastern Europe (with the exception of 
Hungary) suffered dramatic deindustrialization, unemployment and underemployment. These 
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countries were then abruptly integrated into the EU, creating enormous economic and social 
tensions. From the point of view of Western Europe, the factor price equalization promised by 
international trade theory proved to be an equalization downward.
Listian principle: The preconditions for wealth, democracy and political freedom are all the 
same: a diversiﬁ  ed manufacturing sector subject to increasing returns12 (which historically 
means manufacturing, but also includes knowledge-intensive services). This was the principle 
promoted by the ﬁ  rst United States Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton (1791), 
upon which the United States economy was built. It was rediscovered by George Marshall in 
1947, as mentioned above.
Neoclassical principle: All economic activities are qualitatively alike, so what is produced 
does not matter. The ideology is based on ‘comparative advantage’, without recognizing that 
it is actually possible for a nation to specialize in being poor and ignorant, engage in econom-
ic activities that require little knowledge, and operate under perfect competition and diminish-
ing returns and/or bereft of any scale economies and technological change. 
Listian principle: Economic welfare is a result of synergy. The thirteenth century Florentine 
Chancellor, Brunetto Latini (1210-1294), explained the wealth of cities as a common weal 
(‘un ben comune’; see Reinert, 1999). 
Neoclassical principle: “There is no such thing as society”, Margaret Thatcher (1987).
As Kuhn described above, these Listian principles cannot be captured by the tools of the reigning eco-
nomic paradigm. Understanding List requires the recognition of qualitative differences between economic 
activities, diversity, innovations, synergies and historical sequencing of processes—all of which are blind 
spots in standard economics. 
Working with economic tools that prevent them from understanding List’s points, today’s main-
stream economists grope for explanations of continued poverty. They return to factors that have been stud-
ied and discarded, like race and climate, and refuse to see how historical experience demonstrates that the 
economic structure of wealthy countries have certain characteristics that poor nations lack, e.g., increasing 
returns, innovation, diversity and synergies. The collapse of the ﬁ  rst wave of globalization led economists 
to eugenics and racial hygiene.13 Africans were not seen as poor because of the colonial economic struc-
tures that had been imposed on the continent, but rather because they were black. Today, the ostensibly 
more politically correct version of this type of theory is that Africa is poor because blacks are corrupt. 
Diversity as a precondition for development
Another blind spot of economics is its inability to understand the importance of diversity for economic 
growth. Diversity is a key factor in development for a variety of reasons. First, a diversity of activities 
with increasing returns—maximizing the number of professions in an economy—is the basis for the 
synergy effects called economic development. This was the standard understanding from the 1600s (see 
Reinert, 2004 a). Second, modern evolutionary economics point to the importance of diversity as a basis 
for selection between technologies, products and organizational solutions, all of which are key elements 
12  The works of Jane Jacobs on the role of the cities arrive at the same conclusion as List, albeit from a different 
starting point. 
13  Irving Fisher was both a leading economist and the leader of the eugenics movement in the United States in this 
period. For a discussion, see Ross (1998).
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in an evolving market economy (see Nelson and Winter, 1982). Third, diversity has been an important 
explanation for European ‘exceptionalism’, where a large number of nation-states, in competition with one 
another, created tolerance and a demand for diversity. A scholar, whose views were not popular with a par-
ticular king or ruler, could ﬁ  nd employment in a different nation, thus creating a greater diversity of ideas. 
Fourth, religious diversity was emphasized by Johann Friedrich von Pfeiffer (1718-1787), one of 
the most inﬂ  uential German economists of the eighteenth century. While some economists believe that 
more rapid economic growth is promoted by some religions, rather than others,14 Richard Tawney (1926), 
the famous English historian, emphasized the declining importance of religion in propelling capitalism. 
About 150 years earlier, Pfeiffer argued that when a diversity of ‘competing’ religions exists within a 
state, religion, as an institution, will lose much of its power over the inhabitants. The existence of alterna-
tives will remove fear and other factors that contribute to fanaticism, and a new tolerance will open up for 
a desirable diversity of its population and skills (Pfeiffer, 1778). 
We live in an age of great ignorance today, where established qualitative arguments exploring the 
process of economic development have been abandoned. The importance of diversity is just one of these 
arguments. The banality of today’s explanations about poverty being a result of climate and corruption 
amply testiﬁ  es to this ignorance, which is fortiﬁ  ed by the absence of historical knowledge and of an inter-
est in proven principles that have brought nation after nation from poverty to wealth over ﬁ  ve centuries. 
As Paul Krugman has pointed out, previous economic insights tend to fade away, only to be rediscovered 
later. In a situation similar to the one we are in now, an enlightened group of nineteenth-century German 
economists caught the ear of Chancellor Bismarck and were allowed to design that country’s developmen-
tal and welfare state. Similarly, just after World War II, the world understood that economic development 
was the result of synergies and increasing returns. Combined with the political threat of communism, this 
understanding made it possible to overrule the free trade ideologies in Washington and reindustrialize 
Europe and industrialize parts of Asia. In order to restart growth, it is necessary to reinvent this type of 
economic theory. 
Policy implications 
Aiming for increasing returns, diversity and the common weal
From an economic point of view, the poor populations on the world periphery may be seen either in terms 
of consumption or in terms of production. From the consumption point of view, there are two billion 
people whose extremely low purchasing power causes them to live on the brink of famine and disease. 
One suggestion would be to give them more purchasing power through aid, and it is this suggestion that 
has inspired the MDGs and traditional development assistance. Since many of the victims of poverty are 
farmers, another normal reaction would be to make their farming more efﬁ  cient. 
These policies, however, go squarely against successful development policies of the past. Only 
the presence of manufacturing industry produces efﬁ  cient agriculture. As David Hume (1767) said in his 
History of England, “Promoting husbandry...is never more effectually encouraged than by the increase 
of manufactures”. The conscious creation of such synergies and the economic diversity that makes them 
possible have been mandatory ‘passage points’ for all nations going from poverty to wealth since the late 
1400s (see Reinert and Reinert, 2005). 
14  Werner Sombart emphasized the role of Judaism, and Max Weber the role of Protestantism.18  DESA Working Paper No. 14
From a production point of view, incorporating insights from David Hume to George Marshall, 
we get a very different picture which shows a world suffering from a huge underutilization of resources, 
with around two billion people who are severely underemployed or unemployed, engaged in economic 
activities that are far from ‘efﬁ  cient’. This is the logic found in the original Bretton Woods agreement: 
poor nations are operating very far from their production possibility frontier, many resources being 
underutilized.
The Marshall Plan was based on the principle of fully utilizing underutilized resources to protect 
and create industrialization, diversity and activities with increasing returns in all the nations involved. The 
post-war interpretation of poverty included assigning a social cost to the underutilization of resources, 
e.g., unemployment that could be measured using shadow prices, and justiﬁ  ed temporary protection to 
achieve both full employment and a diversiﬁ  ed industrial structure. Today, the Washington Consensus 
uses models assuming full employment, assigning no social or other costs to the fact that human resources 
in Third World countries are hugely underemployed. Viewing palliative economics as the only solution is 
thus a natural consequence of this view. 
In an expanding world economy, where many raw materials are rapidly becoming strategic com-
modities, the poor ‘stand in the way’ of access to these raw materials, not unlike the native American 
‘Indians’ being a hindrance to the settlers’ use of land. For some United States conservatives, placing the 
poor on ‘reservations’ is an option to be seriously considered. Only a decade ago, two American authors 
recommended the establishment of a custodial state in a much publicized book: “by custodial state, we 
have in mind a high-tech and more lavish version of the Indian reservation for some substantial minority 
of the nation’s population, while the rest of America tries to go about its business” (Herrnstein and Mur-
ray, 1994: 526). The MDGs are uncomfortably close to combining the consumption-based view of poverty 
with the idea of establishing reservations where the basic needs of the poor are taken care of while the rest 
of the world gets along with its business. 
In the original Bretton Woods agreement, unemployment and underemployment justiﬁ  ed the 
protection of national economies until full employment was reached. National development plans—e.g., 
to industrialize a country—were legitimate reasons for tariff protection under the original Bretton Woods 
agreement. Similarly, today, it is necessary to temporarily let the free trade principle yield to the prin-
ciples of economic development and structural change. In short, the conditionalities of the Washington 
institutions must be subordinated to the original Bretton Woods agreement, as interpreted during its ﬁ  rst 
decades.
In order to implement such policies, we must understand that the process of catching up for very 
poor countries involves a trade-off between the interests of ‘man-the-producer’ and ‘man-the-consumer’. 
In addition, we need to realize that static absolute efﬁ  ciency may differ considerably from long-term in-
come-maximizing efﬁ  ciency. As Paul Samuelson recently said, “You need more temporary protection for 
the losers. My belief is that every good cause is worth some inefﬁ  ciency”. (Süddeutsche Zeitung/New York 
Times, 2004: 10).
At the time when England was the only nation to have industrialized, any consideration of static 
efﬁ  ciency meant that no other nation ought to follow its path to industrialization. All of the nations that 
followed England’s path to wealth did so only by sacriﬁ  cing static efﬁ  ciency in order to achieve a higher 
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tries at that time was just as statically inefﬁ  cient as protecting Africa’s industries is today. The very rapid 
increase in real wages after the boycotts of the United States (during the Napoleonic Wars), and of South 
Africa and Rhodesia, testiﬁ  es to the beneﬁ  cial effects of protectionism, even when imposed from the 
outside. It is important to keep in mind, however, that—unlike many Latin American countries after World 
War II—it is essential to combine protection with national or regional competition. Appendix II estab-
lishes guidelines for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ protection based on historical experience. 
In the poorest periphery, targeting economic diversity has to begin with economic activities that 
already exist. In the original spirit of Bretton Woods or Keynesian doctrine, one starting point for increas-
ing real employment would be to identify the smallest tariffs which would maximize economic results in 
terms of employment and national value added, while minimizing the proﬁ  tability of smuggling. For ex-
ample, many poor countries import large quantities of poultry from developed countries. A small tariff on 
poultry could easily create much more employment and value added than the cost of the tariff. It should 
be kept in mind that tariffs have always played the dual role of producing revenues while creating more 
productive economic structures. In weak states, ports were often the only territories fully under govern-
ment control, and tariffs was the easiest form of revenue to collect. 
Free trade among nations at the same level of development has always been beneﬁ  cial. Regional 
integration is, therefore, key to development. The problem, however, is that poor neighbouring countries 
often have little to sell to each other. In Africa, pressures from the United States and the EU, together 
with the spaghetti bowl of regional integration schemes (Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC) Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Southern 
African Development Community (SADC)) and cross-membership of countries in these schemes, present 
difﬁ  culties for development and discourage policies promoting industrialization under local competition. 
The pressures to export faced by developing countries undermine, rather than advance, the Listian prin-
ciple of regional integration that must precede any successful globalization. The EU presses for market 
access for their apples in Egypt, thereby destroying the century-old tradition of Egypt’s buying apples 
from Lebanon. The present carving up of Africa into different economic spheres is exactly the opposite of 
what Africa needs, which is stronger economic integration within Africa and a certain degree of develop-
ment before opening up for globalization. 
A unifying characteristic of the 50 poorest countries in the world today is an almost total absence 
of manufacturing industries. The key insight that having an inefﬁ  cient manufacturing sector produces a 
higher standard of living than having no manufacturing sector at all, will have to be recognized in order 
to transform poor into middle-income nations. Only this insight can stop the parallel race to the bottom in 
terms of democracy and economic welfare. After all, it was common knowledge in the eighteenth century 
that democracies were products of diversiﬁ  ed economic structures, and not the other way around. 
During the last two decades, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
and other United Nations institutions, such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO), the Economic Commission for Latin American the Caribbean (ECLAC), the United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNI-
CEF), have been overshadowed by the aggressiveness of the Washington institutions. The United Nations 
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report Making Global Trade Work for People testiﬁ  es to this censorship. The report—ﬁ  nanced by civil 
society foundations—was almost withdrawn because of political pressure and was only salvaged due to 
the intervention of these same foundations. It is indeed time for United Nations agencies to start working 
together in a more coordinated way in order to be heard. 
In 1956, Nobel Economics Laureate Gunnar Myrdal, advised Third World leaders on the subject 
of economic theory (Myrdal, 1956: 77). He stated that:
“They should be aware of the fact that very much of these theories are partly rationalizations of 
the dominant interest in the advanced and rapidly progressing industrial countries…it…would be 
pathetic if the young social scientists of the under-developed countries got caught in the predilec-
tions of the thinking in the advanced countries, which are hampering the scholars there in their 
efforts to be rational but would be almost deadening to the intellectual strivings of those in the 
under-developed countries. I would instead wish them to have the courage to throw away large 
structures of meaningless, irrelevant and sometimes blatantly inadequate doctrines and theoreti-
cal approaches and to start out from fresh thinking right from their needs and their problems. This 
would then take them far beyond the realm of both out-moded Western liberal economics and 
Marxism.”
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Appendix 1
‘Mercantilist’ economic policies of the generic developmental state
Continuity of policy measures and toolkit, from England in 1485 (under Henry VII) to South Korea in the 
1960s: a mandatory passage point for economic development.
…the fundamental things apply, as time goes by.
Sam, the pianist, in ‘Casablanca’.
Recognition of wealth-creating synergies clustered around activities with increasing returns and con-
tinuous mechanization. Recognition that ‘we are in the wrong business’. Conscious targeting, support 
and protection of activities generating increasing returns.
Granting of temporary monopolies/patents/protection to targeted activities in certain geographical 
areas.
Recognition of development as a synergetic phenomenon and, consequently, of the need for a diversi-
ﬁ  ed manufacturing sector, ‘maximizing the division of labour’ (Serra, 1613)—drawing on observa-
tions of the Dutch Republic and Venice.
Accumulation of empirical evidence showed that the manufacturing sector solved three policy prob-
lems endemic to the Third World: increasing national value added (GDP), increasing employment, 
and balance-of-payment problems. 
Attraction of foreigners to work in targeted activities (historically, religious persecution was impor-
tant).
Weakening of landed interests (from England under Henry VII to South Korea). (Physiocracy as a 
reﬂ  ection of the landowners’ rebellion against this policy.)
Tax breaks for targeted activities.
Cheap credit for targeted activities.
Export subsidies for targeted activities.
Strong support for the agricultural sector, in spite of its clearly being seen as incapable of indepen-
dently bringing the nation out of poverty. 
Emphasis on learning and education (United Kingdom apprentice system under Elizabeth I).
Patent protection for valuable knowledge (Venice from the 1490s).
Export taxes/bans on raw materials to make them more expensive for competing nations (starting with 
Henry VII in late 1400s, whose policy was very effective in severely damaging the wool industry in 
Medici Florence).
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Appendix 2
Two ideal types of protectionism compared
East Asian: ‘good’ Latin American: ‘bad’
Temporary protection of new industries/products 
for the world market.
Permanent protection of mature industries/
products for the home market (often very small).
Very steep learning curves compared to the rest of 
the world.
Learning that lags behind the rest of the world.
Based on a dynamic Schumpeterian view of the 
world—market-driven ‘creative destruction’.
Based on a more static view of the world—
planned economy.
Domestic competition maintained. Little domestic competition.
Core technology locally controlled. Core technology generally imported from abroad/
assembly of imported parts/‘superﬁ  cial’ industri-
alization.
Massive investment in education/industrial policy 
created a huge demand for education. Supply of 
educated people matched demand from industry. 
Less emphasis on education/type of industries 
created did not lead to huge (East Asian) demand 
for education. Investment in education therefore 
tends to feed emigration .
Meritocracy—capital, jobs and privileges 
distributed according to qualiﬁ  cations.
Nepotism in the distribution of capital, jobs and 
privileges.
Equality of land distribution (South Korea). Mixed record on land distribution.
Even income distribution increased home market 
for advanced industrial goods.
Uneven income distribution restricted scale of 
home market and decreased competitiveness of 
local industry.
Proﬁ  ts created through dynamic ‘Schumpeterian’ 
rent-seeking.
Proﬁ  ts created through static rent-seeking.
Intense cooperation between producers and local 
suppliers.
Confrontation between producers and local 
suppliers.
Regulation of technology transfer oriented 
towards maximizing knowledge transferred.
Regulation of technology transfer oriented 
towards avoiding ‘traps’.Development and Social Goals: Balancing Aid and Development ...  23
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